UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-1-2009

Noble v. Kootenai County Supplemental
Respondent's Brief Dckt. 35201

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Noble v. Kootenai County Supplemental Respondent's Brief Dckt. 35201" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2089.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2089

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
JOHN NOBLE, an individual, and
CEDAR RIDGE HOMES, INC., an Idaho
corporation,

Supreme Court Docket
No. 35201
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho acting
through the KOOTENAI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, ELMER
R. (RICK) CURRIE, W. TODD TONDEE,
and RICHARD A. PIAZZA,
COMMISSIONERS, in their official
capacities,

Kootenai County Civil
Case No. CV-07-5180

APR I

DefendantslRespondents.

-SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
.....................
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE HONORABLE JOHN P. LUSTER, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING
Mischelle R. Fulgham
Paul R. Harrington
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S.
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 102
Coeur d1AIene,ID 83814
Attorneys for Appellants

Patrick M. Braden
KOOTENAI COUNTY
451 N. Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur dlAlene, ID 83816-9000
Attorney for Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES .....................................................................

ii

I. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................1
\I. SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT ..............................................................................

2

A. The Board properly conducted its viewing of the subject property under
this Court's prior holdings regarding viewings by judges or juries, which
should be expressly extended to viewings conducted by decisionmaking bodies sitting in a quasi-judicial capacity .......................................

2

B. The Court should use this occasion to clarify its prior decisions
regarding site visits conducted by quasi-judicial bodies ............................

7

Ill. CONCLUSION .........................
.
............................................................................. 9

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
ldaho Cases

Akers v. Morfensen, 2008 Opinion No. 68 (Docket Nos. 33587 and
.
............................................. 1 , 1 n . l , 2, 3
33694, June4, 2008) .............................. .
Akers v. Morfensen, 2009 Opinion No. 6 (Docket Nos. 33587 and
33694, January 22, 2009) ..................................................................................passim
Comer v. Twin Falls Counfy, 130 Idaho 433, 942 P.2d 557 (1997)......................7 , 8 , 10
Eacret

v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 86 P.3d 494 (2004)...................8 , 8 n.4, 9, 10

Highbarger

v. Thornock, 94 Idaho 829, 498 P.2d 1302 ( 1 972) ..................................
7 ,9

Lobdell v. State ex re/. Bd. of Highway Direcfors, 89 ldaho 559, 407
P.2d135(1965).............
.....................
..................................................4 , 4 n . 3 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 9
Marcia T. TurnerLLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144 ldaho 203, 159 P.3d
840 (2007).....................................................................................................................
5
Tyson Creek R. Co. v. Empire Mi// Co., 31 ldaho 580, 774 P. 1004
4 , 4 n.2, 5 , 6 , 9
(1918).......................................................................................................
Uhrig v. Coffin, 72 Idaho 271, 240 P.2d 480 (1 952) ...................
.......

......... 4 , 5, 6 , 9

ldaho Appellate Rules

I.A.R. 34(f)(2)................................................................................................................

1

I.A.R. 35(9 ...............................................................................................................
1 n.1
Other Authorities

89 C.J.S. Trial fj588 .....................................................................................................

5

Appendices

Akers

v. Mortensen, 2008 Opinion No. 68 (June 4 , 2008)............................

Akers

v. Morfensen, 2009 Opinion No. 6 (January 22, 2009).........................Appendix B

Appendix A

I, INTRODUCTION
This case concerns the denial of an application for preliminary approval of a
proposed subdivision known as "Cedar Creek Ranch Estates" by Defendants1
Respondents Kootenai County and the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the County").

The County filed its Brief of

Respondents in this appeal with this Court on October 24, 2008. This appeal has not
yet been set for oral argument as of the date of filing of this Supplemental Brief.
The Brief of Respondents filed in this case relied significantly on the opinion
originally issued on June 4, 2008 by this Court in Akers v. Morfensen, Supreme Court
Docket Nos. 33587 and 33694 (2008 Opinion No. 68)' in its discussion of whether the
visit by the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter "the Board") to the
property at issue in this case prejudiced any substantial rights of Plaintiffs]
PetitionersIAppellants John Noble and Cedar Ridge Homes, Inc. (hereinafter "CRH").
See Brief of Respondents at 24-30. After this brief and CRH's reply brief were filed,
however, this Court issued a Substitute Opinion in Akers on January 22, 2009 (2009
Opinion No. 6). The County then filed a Motion for Leave to Augment Brief pursuant to
Rule 34(f)(2) of the ldaho Appellate Rules on January 30, 2009. This motion was
received by this Court on February 2, 2009, and was granted by order dated

1

Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(f), copies of both 2008 Opinion No. 68 and 2009 Opinion No. 6, as posted to the
ldaho Supreme Court website (http:llwww.isc.idaho.govlopinions/sccivilhtm), are attached as
Appendices A and B to this Supplemental Brief, respectively. Page references correspond to the page
numbers in the attached opinions.

February 25, 2009. In accordance with the County's motion and the Court's order, this
Supplemental Brief will be limited to an analysis of the application of the Substitute
Opinion in Akers to the site visit at issue in this case.

II. SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT
A.

The Board properly conducted its viewing of the subiect property under this
Court's prior holdings reaarding viewinqs by iudqes or iuries, which should be
expressly extended to viewinqs conducted by decision-making bodies sittinq in a
quasi-iudicial capacity.
One of the County's arguments is that the manner in which the viewing of the

property at issue in this case (hereinafter "the subject property") was conducted did not
prejudice any substantial rights of CRH. The County continues to maintain that this
viewing was conducted in a manner consistent with the guidance provided in this
Court's prior decisions. While this position has not changed as a result of the issuance
of the Substitute Opinion issued in Akers, the issuance of that opinion does change the
analysis which is properly used in applying Akers to this case.
The original Akers opinion reviewed this Court's prior decisions since 1918
concerning viewings by juries during the course of trials, and applied those decisions to
viewings by a judge during the course of a trial to the district court without a jury. See
Akers, 2008 Opinion No. 68 at 6-7. This opinion held that viewings of property could not
themselves constitute evidence on which a decision can be based. Id. at 6 (considering
viewing of property by a district judge). Rather, such observations were found to be
"only useful to evaluate and apply the evidence submitted at trial." Id. at 7.

The Substitute Opinion in Akers, however, removed the analysis of the trial
judge's visit to the property at issue in that case which was present in the original
opinion. Compare Akers, 2009 Opinion No. 6 at 5-12 with Akers, 2008 Opinion No. 68
at 5-9. Instead, it merely analyzed whether certain of the trial judge's findings were
based on substantial and competent evidence. Akers, 2009 Opinion No. 6 at 8-12.
Based on that analysis, the Court affirmed some of those findings, and found that the
trial judge had erred in making certain other findings. Id.
The Substitute Opinion specifically mentioned that "[tJhe district court examined a
number of exhibits and personally viewed the property during the trial before concluding
that the scope of the prescriptive easement was limited to a width of 12.2 feet." Id. at
12. It also acknowledged that "ItJhe district court found, based on its viewing of the
property and the record, that the width of the traveled portion of the access road was

12.2 feet." Id. After reviewing the specific findings and the evidence on which they
were based, this Court concluded that "the district court's finding is supported by
substantial and competent evidence," and affirmed the district court's decision on that
issue. Id.
Unlike the original Akers opinion, the Substitute Opinion did not analyze the
propriety of the trial judge's visit to the site. In that opinion, this Court instead appeared
to acknowledge that the viewing of the property was proper, so long as the ultimate
decision was based on substantial and competent evidence in the form of trial testimony
and exhibits admitted during the course of the trial. See Akers, 2009 Opinion No. 6 at 4,

12. This view is consistent with this Court's prior cases concerning site visits performed
by judges or juries during the course of a trial.
In Tyson Creek R. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 31 ldaho 580, 174 P. 1004 (1918)*, a
jury instruction regarding a site visit by the jury was challenged on the basis that it
permitted the jury "to consider as evidence the knowledge obtained from a view of the
premises." Tyson Creek, 174 P. at 1007. While this Court indicated that it was "very
doubtful whether the jurors were misled" by the instruction given, it also stated that the
jury should have been instructed "that they could only use the knowledge obtained by
their view of the premises in determining the weight and applicability of the evidence
introduced at the trial, and that a view of the premises does not supply a want of
evidence, and is not of itself evidence upon which a verdict may be based." Id.
In Uhrig v. Coffin, 72 ldaho 271, 240 P.2d 480 (1952), this Court applied the rule
from Tyson Creek to a viewing conducted by a judge during a court trial. Uhrig, 72
ldaho at 274, 240 P.2d at 481. In that case, the court stated that while the viewing the
trial judge conducted "is not a substitute for nor may be considered as evidence, such
viewing and inspection are to be considered in determinina the weight and applicability
of the evidence." Id. (citation omitted; emphasis added).
Later, in Lobdell v. State ex re/. Bd. of Highway Directors, 89 ldaho 559, 407
P.2d 135 (1965),~this Court recognized that "on a trial of a cause by the court sitting

2

Tyson Creek was cited in the original Akers opinion. Akers, 2008 Opinion No. 68 at 6.

3

Lobdell was also cited in the original Akers opinion. Akers, 2008 Opinion No. 68 at 6-7.

without a jury, the court has discretionary power to inspect the premises during the
course of the trial in order to evaluate and apply the evidence submitted." iobdeli, 89
ldaho at 567, 407 P.2d at 139. The Court then found that the trial court erred by
conducting such inspection without notice to the parties. Id. at 567, 407 P.2d at 139-40.
It cited Tyson Creek and Uhrig in setting forth the proper standard for the consideration
of such visits, and summarized this standard as follows:

A view or inspection of the character under consideration is permissible for
the purpose of enabling the court properly to understand the evidence,
and properly to apply it. A view may be considered as bearing on the
credibility of the witnesses who appeared at the trial. It cannot be
considered as evidence or have the effect of supplying evidence
independent of, or in addition to, that taken in the course of the trial, or
supplant evidence adduced, or meet the requirement that proof of
necessary facts be made.
Id. at 567-68, 407 P.2d at 139-40 (citing 89 C.J.S. Trial ij 588, at 369-70).
This Court has previously found that there is no analytical difference between
such views and viewings conducted by governing boards or hearing bodies acting as in
a quasi-judicial capacity. See Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144 ldaho
203, 209, 159 P.3d 840, 846 (2007) ("When acting upon a quasi-judicial zoning matter
the governing board is neither a proponent nor an opponent of the proposal at issue, but
sits instead in the seat of a judge"). Thus, the rule announced in Tyson Creek, U h i g
and iobdell is easily extended to viewings conducted by a decision-making body sitting
in a quasi-judicial capacity, notwithstanding the removal of this analysis from the
Substitute Opinion in Akers. Under the Akers Substitute Opinion, a finding may be

"based on its viewing of the property and the record," so long as the finding is supported
by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Akers, 2009 Opinion No. 6 at 12.
The rule from Tyson Creek, Uhrig and Lobdell allows the use of observations made
during a viewing to enable the decision-making body to understand and apply the
evidence already in the record, and to weigh the credibility of testimony, but specifically
prohibits those observations from being used as a substitute for evidence not in the
record. See Lobdell, 89 Idaho at 567-68,407 P.2d at 139-40.
Here, CRH's project engineer, Russ Helgeson, provided a map of the property to
County staff prior to the site visit in accordance with the Board's decision to leave the
public hearing open to allow for such submissions and to conduct the site visit. Agency
Tr. p. 78-79. CRH has contended that Mr. Helgeson should have had the opportunity to
explain certain markings on that map, and to correlate those markings to flags set at
various points on the property, during the site visit. See R. p. 40-42; Brief of Appellants
at 28-33. However, under the authority cited above, this would have been improper
because the Board could only use the viewing of the subject property to understand and
apply the evidence already in the record, including the map in question, but could not
take additional evidence, including any additional testimony Mr. Helgeson may have
wished to proffer. Therefore, the decision to keep Mr. Helgeson from providing the
information he wished to provide was not erroneous, and did not deprive CRH of due
process or any other substantial rights.

B.

The Court should use this occasion to clarify its prior decisions reaardina site
visits conducted by auasi-judicial bodies.
The application of this Court's prior holdings regarding judicial viewings to site

visits conducted by quasi-judicial bodies, including the Substitute Opinion in Akers, still
necessitates a reexamination of the Court's prior statements specifically concerning
such viewings. In Comer v. Twin Falls County, 130 ldaho 433, 942 P.2d 557 (1997),
this Court held that "before a local zoning body, whether it be the Commission or the
Board, views a parcel of property in question, it must provide notice and the opportunity
to be present to the parties." Comer, 130 ldaho at 439, 942 P.2d at 563. The Court
quoted another of its prior decisions regarding a jury viewing for the reasons behind this
holding:
First, notice to the parties provides them with an opportunity to contest the
propriety of such a viewing under the particular circumstances .... More
importantly, notice to the parties provides them with an opportunity to be
present at the time of the inspection, which in turn will insure that the court
does not mistakenly view the wrong object or premises.
Id. (quoting Highbarger v. Thornock, 94 ldaho 829, 831, 498 P.2d 1302, 1304 (1972)).

This is consistent with this Court's holding in LobdeN with respect to judicial viewings,
and provides the ability of an applicant or other affected person to object to the viewing
on the limited basis that the governing board or hearing body mistakenly viewed the
wrong property. Compare Comer, 130 ldaho at 439, 942 P.2d at 563, with Highbarger,
94 ldaho at 831, 498 P.2d at 1304, and LobdeN, 89 ldaho at 567-68, 407 P.2d at 13940. It is also not inconsistent with the Substitute Opinion in Akers regarding the ability

to base a decision in part on a viewing as long as there is substantial evidence in the
record in support of that decision. See Akers, 2009 Opinion No. 6 at 12
Here, CRH has not made the argument that the Board viewed the wrong
property, and the District Court confirmed that "[tlhere's no indication in the record that
the county commissioners had, in fact, examined the wrong property, [or] had gone to
the wrong location." Tr. p. 57. Therefore, no violation of the issue identified in Comer
occurred. Cf. Comer, 130 ldaho at 439, 942 P.2d at 563.
In addition, in order to properly apply the Substitute Opinion in Akers and this
Court's prior holdings regarding judicial viewings to site visits conducted by quasijudicial bodies, it is important for the Court to clarify a dictum contained in its opinion in
Eacref v. Bonner Counfy, 139 ldaho 780, 86 P.3d 494 (2004). In the context of a
discussion of the factors surrounding the determination as to whether a decision maker
is biased, the Court stated on the one hand that a "quasi-judicial officer must confine his
or her decision to the record produced at the public hearing," but then also stated that
"the opportunity to be present at a view provides opposing parties the opportunity to
rebut facts derived from the visit that may come to bear on the ultimate decision... ."
Eacref, 139 ldaho at 786, 86 P.3d at 500 (emphasis added).4 While the former

in that case, the Court vacated and remanded a decision of the Bonner County Board of Commissioners
on the basis of statements made by a commissioner who had cast the deciding vote to grant a variance
which indicated an obvious bias in favor of the applicant. Eacret, 139 ldaho at 784-87, 86 P.3d at 498501. For this reason and because the Court also found that the same commissioner had conducted a
viewing of the property without notice to the parties which would have afforded them the opportunity to be
present, the above quote was not necessary to the decision. See id.

statement is consistent with this Court's prior holdings that a viewing is not evidence but
instead merely affords the trier of fact the opportunity to apply and evaluate evidence
already in the record, the latter statement is inconsistent with this holding. Compare id.
with Lobdell, 89 ldaho at 567-68, 407 P.2d at 140, and Uhrig, 72 Idaho at 274, 240 P.2d
at 481. If observations made at a site visit are not evidence, how can "facts derived
from the visit" exist which would be subject to rebuttal?
This Court should also address the practical effects of applying its prior decisions
regarding judicial viewings, including the Substitute Opinion in Akers, to site visits by
quasi-judicial bodies, and the proper conduct of such visits. Do public hearings need to
remain open for the purpose of a site visit if the observations made during that time are
not evidence? Are statements made by members of the governing board or hearing
body during a site visit merely deliberations, or must parties be afforded the opportunity
to rebut such statements, as Eacret seems to indicate? Must the public hearing be
continued or re-opened to receive objections that the wrong property was viewed, as
Comer requires, or may such objections be deemed legal argument and be received
and decided after the public hearing is closed?
Ill. CONCLUSION
This Court's prior decisions regarding judicial viewings, including Tyson Creek,
Uhrig, Lobdell, Highbarger, and the Substitute Opinion recently issued in Akers, should

be expressly extended to viewings conducted by decision-making bodies sitting in a
quasi-judicial capacity. In applying those precedents to this case, the Court should

reconcile its prior statements in Comer and Eacret so as to require only that before a
declslon is ultimately made on the application, tne decision-making body must provide
an opportunity to object to the viewing on the limited basis that the wrong property was
viewed. The Court should also take this opportunity to address the practical application
of its precedents, including the Substitute Opinion in Akers and its decision in this case,
to the conduct of site visits by quasi-judicial decision-making bodies. Finally, in this
case, the Court should find that the District Court correctly held that conduct of the site
visit in this case did not violate any substantial rights of CRH because that holding was
consistent with the Substitute Opinion in Akers and this Court's precedents regarding
judicial viewings. Cf. Tr. at 55-60.
Therefore, for the reasons stated above and in the previously filed Brief of
Respondents, the County reasserts that the decision of the District Court affirming the
decision of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners in Case No. S-842P-06
should be AFFIRMED.
Dated this

2yaL day of March, 2009.
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
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LN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O F IDAHO
Docket No. 33587133694
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SBERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,

)

1
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

)
)

V.

VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MART1 E. )
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,
1
Defendants-Appellants,

Lewiston, March 2008 Term
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2008 Opinion No. 68

1

Filed: June 4,2008

)
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Stephen Kenyon, Clerk

and
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife,

)

Defendants.
j
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. )
AKERS, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

1
)

D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife,

)

1
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Defendants-Appellants,
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and

)

VERNON ,I. MORTENSEN and MART1 E.
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,

)

Defendants.
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)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Kootenai County. f-lonorable John T. Mitchell, District Judge.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the district court are vacated, and
the case is remmded.
Givens Pursley, LLP, Boise, for appellants Mortensen. Terri Yost argued.
Robert Covington, Mayden, for appellants White,
James Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d'Alene, for respondents. Susan Weeks
argued.

HORTON, Justice
This appeal arises from a bench trial concerning an easement and trespass dispute.
Vernon and Marti Mortensen, David and Michelle White, and D.L. White Construction, Inc.
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Appellants")

appeal the district court's judgment

regarding the existence, scope, and location of Appellants' easement across Respondents Dennis
and Sherrie Akers' property and the district court's award of compensatory and punitive
damages for trespass and emotional distress.
concerning this case in Akers

1).

This Court previously decided an appeal

D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005)

(Akers I). We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACICGROUND
The facts of this case are set out in detail in Akers I. There are four parcels of property
involved in this case: "Government Lot 2," "Parcel A," "Parcel B" and the "Reynolds Property."
The four parcels are rectangular and meet together at a four-way corner. Government Lot 2 is
located to the northeast, and Parcel B is to the northwest. The Akers own the southwestern
corner of Goverllment Lot 2 and the southeaster~lcorner of Parcel B. Parcel A is located to the
southwest and much of Parcel A, including that adjoining Parcel B, is owned by the Whites. The
Mortensens own a portion of Parcel A located to the south of that owned by the Whites. The
Reynolds Property is located to the southeast and is not owned by any of the parties to this
litigation. Together, the Whites and Mortensens plan to subdivide and develop their respective
properties.

Government Lot 2 is bisected roughly north to south by a county road, Millsap Loop
Road Appellants hold an easement for ingress and egress to Millsap Loop Road across portions
of the Akers' property. Because the properties meet at a four-way corner, Parcel A and
Government Lot 2 do not actually s'hare a border. it is therefore physically impossible to access
Parcel A from Millsap Loop Road in Government Lot 2 without also passing through some other
property.
The Akers acquired their real property in 1980. At the time of acquisition, a road
provided access to Parcel A, running through the southern portion of Govermnent Lot 2 and the
southeastern comer of Parcel B. The access road was connected to Millsap Loop Road by an
approach (the original approach) that turned sharply north from the access road, which runs east
to west. The original approach was located on a blind curve in Millsap Loop Road. In order to
obtain a building permit, the Akers were required to alter the entrance point of the access road
where it connects to Millsap Loop Road, so that the entrance had a 30-foot line of sight in each
direction of Millsap Loop Road. The Akers constructed a new approach (the curved approach),
which starts to turn earlier and curves more gently to the north before meeting Millsap Loop
Road. The Akers eventually quarreled with the Whites' predecessors in interest, the Peplinskis,
over the Peplinskis' use of the access road, leading to the Peplinskis filing a lawsuit. The
PeplinsltiIAkers suit ended in 1994 when the Peplinskis sold their property, including Parcel A,
to the Mortensens. The Mortensens later sold much of Parcel A, including that portion adjoining
Parcel B, to the Whites.
In January 2002, the Akers blocked Appellants' use of the curved approach to the access
road and forbade Appellants from traveling on the western end of the access road where it passes
through Parcel B before connecting to Appellants' property in Parcel A. Appellants then brought
in heavy equipment, including a bulldozer, to carve a route around the Akers' gate and to
otherwise alter the access road. This led to a series of confrontations between the Akers and
Appellants, as well as alleged damage to the Alters' property and alleged malicious behavior by
Appellants.
In response, the Akers filed the instant action for trespass, quiet title, and negligence.
During the trial, the district court personally viewed the access road and propcrty in question.
The district court confirmed to Appellants an express easement 12.2 feet in width across the
Alters' property ill Government Lot 2, through the original approach, but not the curved

approach, to Millsap Loop Road. Although the district court confirmed Appellants' easement
across part of the Akers' land, the court hund that the easement ended at the western boundary
of Government Lot 2 and did not cross into the Akers' property in Parcel B.
The district court also awarded rhe i i ~ e r s compensatory damages arising fiorn
Appellants' trespass in the amount of $17,002.85, which was trebled pursuant to I.C.

9 6-202 for

a total of $51,008.55, to be paid by Appellants jointly and severally. Sherrie Akers was awarded
$10,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress, also to be paid jointly and severally by
Appellants. Additionally, the district court entered punitive damage awards in favor of the Akers
against the Mortensens in the amount of $150,000 and against the Whites in the amount of
$30,000. Finally, the district court granted an award of costs and attorney fees to the Alters, to
be paid jointly and severally by the Mortensens and Whites, in the amount of $105,534.06.
Appellants appealed from that judgment and the dispute came before this Court in Akers

I

This Court remanded the case to the district court for additional fact finding and a

determination regarding whether Appellants were entitled to a prescriptive easement or an
easement implied from prior use. Additionally, we vacated the award of damages, costs, and
attorney fees for further consideration in light of the district court's conclusions on remand
regarding the scope of Appellants' easement rights.
On remand, the district court concluded that Appellants were not entitled to an implied
easement from prior use because the access road was not reasonably necessary for the enjoyment
of the dominant estate, Parcel A. The district court based this conclusioll of law on its finding
that, at the time of the severance of the dominant estate from the servient estate, there was a
second road that provided access to Parcel A. The district court concluded that Appellants were
entitled to a prescriptive easement across Government Lot 2, 12.2 feet in width, which was
coextensive with the scope and location of the express easement. The district court also found
the prescriptive easement passed fiom Government Lot 2 into Parcel B and immediately turned
ninety degrees to the south to provide access to Parcel A. Based on these findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the district court reinstated the award of damages, costs, and atlorney fees
from Akers I, and awarded the Akers their costs and attorney fees on remand. Appellants timely
appealed from the district court's order on remand.

11. STANDARD OP REVIEW

Review of a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports
the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Benninger
v. Uerifield, 142 Idaho 486, 488, I29 P.3d 1235, 1237 (2006) (citing Alumei v. sear Lake

Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812 P.2d 253,256 (1991)). Since it is the province of the trial
court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses,
this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment
entered. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942 (1999) (citing Sun Valley

Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391
(1990)). A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless the findings are
clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006)
(citing Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 856, 55 P.3d 304, 310 (2002);

Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 650, 39 P.3d 588, 590 (2001); 1.R.C.P
52(a)). If the findings of fact are based upon substantial evidence, even if the evidence is
conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at
1238 (citing Hunter v. Shields, 13 1 Idaho 148, 151, 953 P.2d 588, 591 (1998)). This Court will
not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Ransom, 143 ldaho at 643, 152 P.3d
at 4 (citing Bram~x?ll,136 Idaho at 648, 39 P.3d at 588). The findings of the trial court on the
question of damages will not be set aside when based upon substantial and competent evidence.

Trilogy Network Sys, Inc. v. .Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P.3d 1119, 1121 (2007) (citing
Idaho Falls Bonded Produce Supply Co. v. General Mills Rest. Group, Inc., 105 Idaho 46, 49,
665 P.2d 1056,1059 (1983)).

111. ANALYSIS
Both sides to this appeal ask this Court to finally resolve their dispute. We are unable to
fulfill their requests. We conclude that the district court's factual findings were based, in part,
upon irnpermissible reliance on a viewing of the property. Normally, we would remand the case
to the district court for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this
opinion. However, the parties have displayed a high degree of animosity towards each other and
the district judgc. We conclude that it is in the best interest of all parties involved, including the
district judge, to vacate the judgment and remand the case for a new trial before a different

district judge. Although this remedy is rarely exercised by this Court, we find it best serves the
interest of justice.

A. The district court erred when making factual findings relating to the scope and
!ocrtion of Appellants' prescriptive easement.
The district court relied upon its personal on-site view of the subject property to find
certain facts relating to the scope of Appellants' prescriptive easement.

This was error.

Additionally, the district court's finding regarding the location of the easement on Parcel B was
not suppo~tedby substantial and competent evidence.
The district court's finding that Appellants' prescriptive easement was 12.2 feet wide was
based substantially on its view of the property. The district court specifically found that:
"[Appellants'] argument that the easement should be 25 feet wide is simply unsupported by the
record and a view of the premises." Appellants argued that the easement should be 25 feet wide,
including ditches and shoulders. The district court, however, found that: "The view and the
exhibits show that not all of the length of the roadway has ditches on either or both sides, nor did
the view show any consistent 'shoulders."'

We conclude that the district court's reliance on its

site view was error. It is well established in Idaho that the knowledge obtained by a jury view of
a premises can only be used to determine the weight and applicability of the evidence introduced
at trial and that a view of the premises "is not of itself evidence upon which a verdict may be
based." Tyson Creek R.R. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 31 Idaho 580, 590, 174 P. 1004, 1007 (1918).
When construing a prior Idaho statute that permitted a jury to view the premises in question, this
Court held: "'The purpose of the statute is not to permit the taking of evidence out of coui-t, but
simply to permit the jury to view the place where the transaction is shown to have occurred, in
order that they may the better understand the evidence which has been introduced."'

Stale v.

McClurg, SO Idaho 762,796, 300 P. 898, 91 1 (1931) (quoting State v. Main, 37 Idaho 449,459,
216 P. 731, 734 (1923)). Although these cases involve a viewing of the property by a jury, for
purposes of appeIIate review, there is no analytical difference between a jury view and a court
view. The policy underlyil~gthis rule of law is clear: the record must reflect the evidence upon
which the finder of fact made its decision. This Court is simply unable to evaluate the basis of
factual determinations made upon the basis of a view.
These rules remained intact when this Court adopted the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1958. Under I.R.C.P. 43(f), during a trial, the court may order that the court or jury may view
..
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a court view in Lobdell v. State ex rel. Bd. of Highway Dir., a case involving an inverse
condemnation. 89 Idaho 559, 407 P.2d 135 (1965). In Lobdell, after the judge had viewed the
property in question, the district court granted an offset to the plaintiff for restoration of access to
their property that had been limited by curbing constructed by the defendant. Id. at 553, 407
P.2d at 137. This Court held the district court erred when it entered findings based on the results
of an examinatiol~of the premises and noted that an inspection of the premises is only useful to
evaluate and apply the evidence submitted at trial. Id. at 567-68,407 P.2d at 139-40.
Idaho is not alone in adhering to this rule: Bd. of Educ. of Claymont Special Sch. Dist

1).

13 Acres ofLand in Brandywine Hundred, 131 A.2d 180 (Del. 1957); Dude Counly v. Renedo,

147 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1962); Derrick v. Rabun County, 129 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. 1963); State v.

Simerlein, 325 N.E.2d 503 (Ind. App. 1975); Guinn v. Iowa & Sf. L. X. Co., 109 N.W. 209 (Iowa
1906); State v. Lee, 63 P.2d 135 (Mont. 1936); Stale by State PIightliuy Comm 'r v. Gorga, 149
A.2d 266 (N.J. 1959); Myra Found. v. US., 267 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1959) (applying North
Dakota law); In re Appropriation of Worth, 183 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio 1962); Port of Newport v.

Haydon, 478 P.2d 445 (Or. A p p 1970); Durika v. Sch. Dist. ofDerry Township, 203 A.2d 474
(Pa. 1964); Ajootian v. Dir. of Pub. W o r k , 155 A.2d 244 (R.I. 1959) (stating rule in dicta only);

Townsend v. State, 43 N.W.2d 458 (Wis. 1950).
As previously noted, the district court found that the prescriptive easement turned ninety
degrees to the south from the access road immediately upon entering Parcel B. This finding was
not supported by substalltial and competent evidence. The district court found that historically,
the prescriptive easement "tunled south on to defendants' land" and "'disappeared"'

after

crossing into Parcel B. We have carefully examined the exhibits upoil which both Appellants
and Respondents rely, as well as those addressed by the district court in its Order on Remand.
There was tcstimony in the record, offered by Richard Peplinski, that the prescriptive easement
traveled in a western direction across Parcel B for at least 125 feet before it curved onto his
property to provide access to a Quonset hut. Although the Alters claim that the evidence on this
subject is conflicting, we are not so persuaded. The aerial photograph upon which the Akers rely
clearly shows a roadway resembling a shepherd's crook, extending well east into Parcel B before
curving back to the soutl~westtoward the Quonset hut. The exhibits offered by the Respondeuts
are similar. All exhibits are consistent with Peplinslci's testimony and reveal that the access road

traveled east into Parcel B before curving back towards the Quonset hut on Parcel A. For these
reasons, we find this finding to be clearly erroneous.
Thc district court erred when it relied on its site view to find the scopc of the easement
and the district court's finding regarding the location of rhe easement on Parcel B is not based
upon substantial and competent evidence. Therefore, the judgment establishing the location and
scope of Appellants' easement must be vacated.

B. The district court's award of compensatory and punitive damages must be vacated.
The district couri also erred when it reinstated the damage award from Akevs I. That
damage award was based, in part, upon the district court's view of the premises. The district
court awarded the Akers trespass damages resulting from Appellants' efforts to improve the road
on Parcel B. These improvements consisted of excavation and the dumping of fill to provide a
road base. The district court found that these activities occurred to the west of where it located
Appellants' prescriptive easement on Parcel B. We have determined that the district court's
factual finding as to the location of the easement on Parcel B is clearly erroneous. The district
court specifically found that it had "viewed the area, and qound] such excavation to have
occurred further to the west of where the road immediately went into what would be the exact
northeast corner of what is now [Parcel A]." The damage award also compensated the Akers for
Appellants' trespass outside the scope of Appellants 12.2-foot prescriptive easement across
Government Lot 2. As indicated above, the district court's finding that the scope of Appellants'
prescriptive easement was 12.2 feet in width was based upon the district court's view of the
premises. Accordingly, the entirety of the trespass damages award must be vacated.
The district court's determination of damages for emotional distress and its award of
punitive damages related to conduct by Appellants in the course of that which the district court
determined to be trespass. As the scope of trespass, if any, will be determined in a new trial, we
vacate the entire award of compensatory and punitive damages. For the same reason, the district
court's award of attorney fees and costs to the Akers is vacated.
C. This matter will be reassigned to a new district judge to conduct a new triai.
Normally, we would remand the case to the district court for additional findings of fact
and conclusio~is of law

However, given the animosity woven into this case, we find it

appropriate to remand the case for assignment to a new district judge. In fairness to the district
judge, and the parties as well, we think it a difficult and uncomfortable task for thc district judge

to now revisit and re-evaluate the evidence, disregarding his own earlier observations and factual
determinations, particularly in light of allegations by Appellants that he cannot act i~npartially.
Although such allegatioi~srarely warrant reassignment, appellate courts in other jurisdictions
have found it besr to assign cases to a new trial judge in certain linlited circiiiilstances. See Beck
v. Beck, 766 A.2d 482, 485 (Del. 2001); In re Guardianship qf Lienernann, Not Reported in
N.W.2d, 2004 WL 420158 (Neb. App. 2004); In re Guardianship qfR.G. and F , 382 A.2d 654,
658 (N.J. 1977); In re Custody qfA.L.A.P.-G., Not Reported in P.3d, 2003 WL 22234910 (Wash.
App. 2003). This case is one of the rare i~lstancesin which reassignment is appropriate.

D. Neither party will receive an award of attorney fees on appeal.
The Akers and the Mortensens have each requested an award of attorney fees on appeal.
As the Alters have not prevailed in this appeal, they are not entitled to an award of attorney fees.
We cannot conclude that the Akers have frivolously defended this appeal. Accordingly, we deny
the Mortensens' request for an award of attorney fees.

IV. CONCLUSION
The judgment is vacated and this case is remanded for a new trial before a different
judge. Costs to Appellants
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and Justice Pro Tem
TROUT, CONCUR.
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HQRTON, Justice
This appeal arises from a bench trial concerning an easemenl and lrespass dispute.
Vernon and Marti Mortensen, David and Michelle White, and D.L. White Construction, Inc.
(hereinafter collecti~relyreferred to as "Appellants") appeal the district court's ruling regarding
the existence, scope, and location of Appellants' easement across Respondents Dennis and
Sherrie Akers' property and the district court's award of compensatory and punitive damages for
trespass and emotional distress. This Court previously decided an appeal concerning this case in

Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005) (Akers I). We affirm in
part and vacate in part the district court's judgment issued after Akers I and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are set out in detail in Akers I. There are four parcels of property
involved in this case: "Government Lo1 2," "Parcel A," "Parcel B" and the "Reynolds Property."
The four parcels are rectangular and meet together at a four-way corner. Government Lot 2 is
located to the northeast, and Parcel B is to the northwest. The Akers own the southwestern
corner of Government Lot 2 and the southeastern corner of Parcel B. Parcel A is located to the
southwest and much of Parcel A, including that adjoining Parcel B, is owned by the Whites. The
Mortensens own a portion of Parcel A located to the south of that owned by the Whites. The
Reynolds Property is located to the southeast and is not owned by any of the parties to this
litigation. Together, the Whites and Mortensens plan to subdivide and develop their respective
properties.

Govcrnment Lot 2 is bisected roughly north to south by a county road, Millsap Loop
Road. Appellants hold an easement for ingress and egress to Millsap Loop Road across portions
of the Akers' property. Because the properties meet at a four-way corner, Parcel A and
Government Lot 2 do nor actually sharc a border. It is therefore p11ysical:j; impossible to

--

akCCSS

Parcel A from Millsap Loop Road in Government Lot 2 without also passing through some other
property.
The Akers acquired their real property in 1980. At the time o.f acquisition, a road
provided access to a Quonset hut on Parcel A, running through the southern portion of
Government Lot 2 and the southeastern corner of Parcel B. The Quonset hut is located near the
border of Parcel A and Parcel B. The access road was connected to Millsap Loop Road by an
approach (the original approach) that turned slrarply north from the access road, which runs east
to west. The original approach was located on a blind curve in Millsap Loop Road. In order to
obtain a building permit, the Akers were required to alter the entrance point of the access road
where it connects to Millsap Loop Road, so that the entrance had a 30-foot line of sight in each
direction of Millsap Loop Road. The Alters constructed a new approach (the curved approach),
which starts to turn earlier and curves more gently to the north before meeting Millsap Loop
Road. The Akers eventually quarreled with the Whites' predecessors in interest, the Peplinskis,
over the Peplinskis' use of the access road, leading to the Peplinsltis filing a lawsuit. The
Pepli~lskiiAkerssuit ended in 1994 when the Peplinsltis sold their property, including Parcel A,
to the Mortensens. The Mortensens later sold much of Parcel A, including that portion adjoining
Parcel B, to the Whites.
In January 2002, the Akers bloclted Appellants' use of the curved approach to the access
road and forbade Appellants from traveling on the western end of the access road where it passes
through Parcel B before connecting to Appellants' property i11 Parcel A. Appellants then brought
in heavy equipment, including a bulldozer, to carve a route around the Akers' gate and to
otherwise alter the access road. This led to a series of confrontations between the Akers and
Appellants, as well as alleged damage to the Akers' property and alleged malicious behavior by
Appellants.
In response, the Akers filed the instant action for trespass, quiet title, and negligence.
The district court bifurcated the trial proceedings. After thc first phase of the trial, the district
court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that Appellants had an express

easement 12.2 feet in width across the Alters' property in Government Lot 2. The district court
determined that the express easement began at Millsap Loop Road, ran through the original
approach rather than the curved approach, and tracked the southern boundary of Government Lo1
2, terminating at the western boundary of illai parcel aiid did not eilttr into the Alters' property in

Parcel B. The district court concluded that Appellants had failed t o establish a prescriptive
easement or an implied easement arising from prior use. The district court further concluded that
Appellants had trespassed and unreasonably interfered with the Akers' use of their property, with
damages to be determined in the second phase of the trial.
Before the damages portion of the trial, the district court personally viewed the property
in dispute in the company of counsel for the parties. After the second phase of the trial, the
district court awarded the Akers compensatory damages arising from Appellants' trespass in the
amount of $17,002.85, which was trebled pursuant to I.C.
he paid by Appellants jointly and severally.

5 6-202 for a total of $51,008.55, to

Sherrie Akers was awarded $10,000 in

compensatory damages for emotional distress, also to be paid jointly and severally by
Appellants. Additionally, the district court entered punitive damage awards in favor of the Akers
against the Mortensens in the amount of $150,000 and against the Whites in the amount of
$30,000. Finally, the district court granted an award of costs and attorney fees to the Alters, to
be paid jointly and severally by the Mortensens and Whites, in the amount of $105,534.06.
Appellants appealed from that judgment and the dispute came before this Court in Akers
I.

This Court remanded the case to the district court for additional fact finding and a

determination regarding whether Appellants were entitled to a prescriptive easement or an
easement implied from prior use. Additionally, we vacated the award of damages, costs, and
attorney fees for further consideration in light of the district court's conclusions on remand
regarding the scope of Appellants' easement rights.

011remand, the district court concluded that Appellants were not entitled to an implied
easement from prior use because the access road was not reasonably necessary for the enjoyment
of the dominant estate, Parcel A. The district court based this conclusion of law on its finding
that, at the time of the severance of the dominant estate from the servient estate, there was a
second road that provided access to Parcel A. The district court concluded that Appellants were
entitled to a prescriptive easement across Government Lot 2, 12.2 feet in width, which was
coextensive with the scope and location of the express easement. The district court also found

the prescriptive easement passed from Government Lot 2 into Parcel B and immediately turned
ninety degrees to the south to provide access to Parcel A. Based on these findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the district court reinstated the award of damages, costs, and attorney fees
from Akers i,and awarded the kiters their costs and attorney fees on remand. Appellanis tinieiy
appealed from the district court's order on remand.

11. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review oE a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports
the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Benninger

v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006) (citing Alumef v. Bear Lake
Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812 P.2d 253,256 (1991)). Since it is the province of the trial
court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses,
this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment
entered. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942 (1999) (citing Sun Valley

Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391
(1990)). A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless the findings are
clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006)
(citing Canzp v. Easi Fo'ovk Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 856, 55 P.3d 304, 310 (2002);

Bramuiell v. South Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 650, 39 P.3d 588, 590 (2001); 1.R.C.P
52(a)). If the findings of fact are based upon substantial evidence, even if the evidence is
conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at
1238 (citing Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 151, 953 P.2d 588, 591 (1998)). This Court will
not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Rai~som,143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d
at 4 (citing Bruntwell, 136 Idaho at 648, 39 P.3d at 588). The findings of the trial court on the
question of damages will not be set aside when based upoil substantial and competent evidence.

Trilogy Network Sys., inc, v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P.3d 11 19, 1121 (2007) (citing
Idaho Falls Bonded Produce Supply Co. v. General Mills Rest. Group, Inc., 105 Idaho 46, 49,
665 P.2d 1056, 1059 (1983)).
111. ANALYSIS
The parties ask that we resolve all remaining issues in the case without f ~ ~ r t h remand.
er
We are unable to fulfill their requests. We affirm the district court's decision concluding that
Appellants do not hold an easement implied from prior use across the Akers' property. We also

affirm the district court's finding that Appellants hold a prescriptive easement across
Government Lot 2 totaling 12.2 feet in width that is coextensive with the scope and location of
Appellants' express easement. I-Iowever, we conclude that the district cou~.t'sfinding concerning
the location of Appeiiants' prescriptive easement across Parcel I3 is not supported by siibstantia:
and competent evidence and we vacate this finding and remand the issue to the district court.
We also vacate and remand the district court's award of damages in favor of the Akers for
further determination consistent with the district court's conclusions concerning Appellants'
easement rights on remand.
Appellants argue that (1) the district court's Order on Remand did not comply with
I.R.C.P. 52(a); (2) the district court erred when it concluded that Appellants do not have an
easement by implication across the Akers' real property; (3) the district court erred when it found
that Appellants' prescriptive easement is coextensive. with

ellant ants'

expressed easement

across Government Lot 2 and the prescriptive easement turns immediately to the south upon
turning into Parcel B; (4) the district court erred when it awarded the Akers compensatory and
punitive damages for trespass and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (5) the district
court erred when it awarded the Akers attorney fees and costs below.

We address these

arguments in turn.
A. Although the district court's Order on Remand failed to comply with the
requirements of I.R.C.P. 52(a), it is sufficient to permit appellate review.
Appellants argue that the district court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of
law on remand in accordance with I.R.C.P. 52(a). Rather than remanding this case, Appellants
ask to resolve their claims of easement because the relevant facts and conclusions to be drawn
therefrom are clear and obvious in the record.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides in relevant part:
In all actions tried upon the facts without ajury or with an advisoly jury,
the corn shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment . . . . A written
memoraildum decision issued by the court may constitute the findings of fact and
conclusions of law only if the decision expressly so states or iS it is thereafter
adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law by order ofthe court.
The district court issued a written memorandum decision that did not expressly state that
the decision constituted its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Neither did the district court

adopt the memorandum decision as its findings of fact and conclusions of law by order.
Accordingly, the Order on Remand did not comply with the requirements of I.R.C.P. 52(a).
However, this conclusion does not end our inquiry.
CC
The purpose of the underlying rule is to "a~iord
the appeliate couri a clear undcrstd,..A:-,.
I ~ u , , , ~

of the basis of the trial court's decision, so that it might be determined whether the trial court
applied the proper law to the appropriate facts in reaching its ultimate judgment."

Pope v .

Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 225, 646 P.2d 988, 996 (1982) (citing Perry Plumbing
Co. v. Schuler, 96 Idaho 494,497, 531 P.2d 584, 587 (1975)). To that end, the findings required
by Rule 52(a) should be clear, coherent, and complete while avoiding an unnecessary review of
the evidence. Browning 1,. Ringel, 134 Idaho 6 , 14, 995 P.2d 351, 359 (2000).
We considered the effect of a trial court's failure to comply with the requirements of
I.R.C.P. 52(a) in I'etition ofSteve B.D., 111 Idaho 285, 723 P.2d 829 (1986). In that case, the
appellant argued that a magistrate's order must be reversed because the memorandum opinion
did not expressly state it constitutes findings of fact and conclusions of law. We rejected this
argument, stating:
[Wle agree with and affirm the district court who noted: "This court concludes
that it is abundantly clear from a reading of the entire memorandum and order
what facts the magistrate accepted and what law he acted upon." The decision of
[the magistrate] permits meaningful appellate review, and while perhaps
technically violative of I.R.C.P. 52(a), such does not require a remand in this case.
Accord Matter ofndoption of Baby Girl Chance, 609 P.2d 232 (Kan. Ct. App.
1980).

Id. at 292, 723 P.2d at 836. This concIusion is completely consistent with the admonition that
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." I.R.C.P. l(a). Although we expect
the trial courts of this state to comply with our rules of procedure, the interests identified in
I.R.C.P. l(a) would not be served if we were to rigidly interpret I.R.C.P. 52(a) as requiring that a
trial court's decision must bc vacated and remanded solely because of the failure to comply with
the requirements of I.R.C.P. 52(a).
In the instant case, the district court's Order on Remand clearly articulates the facts the
district court accepted and the law that it applied. Our instructions on remand in Akers I directed
the district court to make additional findings and conclusions regarding the Appellants' claims of
an implied easement from prior use and prescriptive easement. As to the existence of an

easement implied from prior use, the district court noted that our decision in Akers I required the
district court to determine whether, at the time of the severance of the dominant and servient
estates, there was an easement across the servient estate that was reasonably necessary to the
proper enjoyment of i'ne ciorninani estate. Tlie district court found that, at thc timc of the
severance of the dominant and servient estates, a "back way" provided access to the dominant
estate. Therefore, the district court found that an implied easement across the servient estate was
not reasonably necessary and concluded that Appellants did not hold an easement implied by
prior use across the Akers' property.
With regard to Appellants' claim of a prescriptive easement, the district court noted that
our decision in Akevs I held that Appellants were entitled to a presumption of adverse use and the
relevant time period the district court was to examine on remand was from 1966 to 1980. The
district court concluded that Appellants had a prescriptive easement across Government Lot 2
that was coextensive with their express easement that continued into Parcel B and turned
immediately south into Appellants' property. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's
Order on Remand affords us a clear understanding of the basis of the district court's decision.
B. The district court did not err when it found that Appellants do not have an
easement by implication across the Akers' property.
In Akers I, we limited the scope of the remand to one of t h e e elements needed to
establish an implied easement from prior use. 142 Idaho at 301, 127 P.3d at 204. In order to
prove the existence of an implied easement by prior use, a party must show: (1) unity of title or
ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous
use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be
permanent; and (3) that the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of
the dominant estate. Id. In Akers I, we held that Appellants had satisfied the first two elements
of an easement implied from prior use. Id. at 302, 127 P.3d at 205. However we remanded the
case due to the lack of findings necessary for the resolution of the question whether in 1966,
when the dominant estate was separated from the servient estate, use of the access road through
Parcel B was "reasonably necessary" to the enjoyment of the dominant estate. Id
Appellants argue that the district court erred when it found that the access road across the
Akers' property was not reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of Appellants' property.
Appellants argue that the district court erred when it found that a back way provided sufficient

alternative access to the property in 1966, and therefore the access road across Government Lot 2
was not reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate.
"'[Rleasonable necessity is something less than the great present necessity required for an
easement implied by necessity."' Beach Late~a:8'atei. L'seis Ass';? -3, Har~"ison,142 Idaho 500,
605, 130 P.3d 1138, 1143 (2006) (quoting Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 643, 991 P.2d 362,
368 (1999)). Because an implied easement from prior use arises at the time of severance, the
issue of reasonable necessity is based upon the circumstances that existed at that time. Akers I,
142 Idaho at 302, 127 P.3d at 205 (citing Davis, 133 Idaho at 642, 991 P.2d at 367).

When

deciding the issue of reasonable necessity, the court should "balance the relative situations pro
and con, as to the respective convenience, inconvenience, costs and all other pertinent, connected
facts." Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266, 270, 215 P.2d 812, 814 (1950) (citations omitted).
Although Eisenbarth involved a private condemnation action under I.C.

5 7-701(5),

its analysis

of reasonable necessity required for the private condemnation of a road is also applicable to the
reasonable necessity required for an implied easement by prior use. Thomas v. Madsen, 142
Idaho 635,639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 13.3 (2006).
The district court found that Appellants "failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that [a] 'back way' did not exist back in 1966" that provided sufficient alternative
access to the dominant estate. The district court found that, in 1966, Appellants' property was
used for agricultural purposes. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the district
court's conclusion that the back way existed in 1966. First, the district court relied on the
testimony of Reynolds, who testified that the back way was an old road. Reynolds did not testify
as to how old the road was, however, he did indicate the road was in existence at the time he was
six years old. When he testified on September 9, 2002, Reynolds was 63 years old, meaning he
was six years old in 1945. Reynolds's testimony indicates that the back way existed prior to the
separation of the dominant and servient estates in 1966. The district court also found that the
back way was depicted on a United States Geological Smvey topographic map from 1901.
Appellants argue that the testimony of William A. Millsap, whose father was the
Appellants' predecessor in interest, proves that the back way did not exist in 1966. During
William Millsap's testimony, Appellants' counsel asked whether there was access to t11e property
by means other than the access road running through the Akers' property. William Millsap
answered: "Uh, no, not tlzat we ever used." (emphasis added). Similarly, Appellants argue the

testimony of Richard Peplinski, whose father was also the Appellants' predecessor in interest,
proves that the back way did not exist in 1966. Appellants' counsel asked Peplinski: "Other than
this access road that was there when you purchased - when your dad purchased the property, was

lhere any other road jiou used lo access the 150 acres?" (emphasis added). Richarc! Peplinski
answered "No."
The district court examined the testimony of both William Millsap and Richard Peplinski
and found that their testimony implied that the back way existed hut it was not used by either of
the witnesses' fathers to access the dominant estate. We conclude that there was substantial
evidence supporting the district court's finding that the back way existed at the time of the
separation of the dominant and servient estates in 1966. When deciding the issue of reasonable
necessity, it is the province of the trial court to balance the respective convenience,
inconvenience, costs, and other pertinent facts. Appellants have not persuaded us that the trial
court's conclusion should be overturned on appeal.
C. The district court's findings of fact regarding the scope and location of the
prescriptive easement are not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
The district court found that Appellants' prescriptive easement was coextensive in scope
and location with Appellants' express easement across Government Lot 2. The district court also
found that the prescriptive easement turned immediately south upon entering Parcel B.
Appellants argue that they hold a prescriptive easement over the entire length of the access road
in Government Lot 2, including the curved approach. Appellants also argue that the prescriptive
easement does not turn immediately south upon entering Parcel B and that t l ~ edistrict court
improperly limited the width of the prescriptive easement to 12.2 feet.

1. The district court did not err when it found that the location of Appellants'
prescriptive easement across the Akers' property was coextensive with the
express easement in Government Lot 2.
Appellants argue that the curved approach is part of their prescriptive easement across
Government Lot 2.

Thc district court found that Appellants' prescriptive easement is

coextensive i11 scope with Appellants' express easement, which does not include the curved
approach. We conclude that Appellants' argument regarding the curved approach is not properly
before this Court on appeal.
Our remand in Alters 1 directed the district court to determine whether a prescriptive
easement across Government Lot 2 was acquired during the time between the severance of the

dominant and servient estates in 1966 and when the Alters purchased the their property in 1980.
The Akers did not construct the curved approach until 1982. Because the Akers constructed the
curved approach after they had purchased their property, the question whether a prescriptive
easement arosc across ti~ccurved apploach was outside the scope of thc rcmand. Thcrcfore, v;e
decline to address this argument on appeal.
2. The district court erred when it found that Appellants' prescriptive easement
turned immediately south upon entering Parcel B.

Appellants argue that thcir prescriptive easement does not turn immediately south upon
entering Parcel B, and instead extends further to the west around a hill before turning south onto
Appeliants' prope~ly. The district court found that the access road on Parcel B, prior to 1980,
turned south immediately after entering Parcel B From Government Lot 2. The district court
included an attached exhibit to its amended judgment that illustrated the location of Appellants'
prescriptive easement on Parcel B. After the prescriptive easement crossed the boundary of
Government Lot 2 into Parcel B, the exhibit indicates that the easement turns 90 degrees to the
south and enters Appellants' property. However, this finding is not supported by substantial and
competent evidence.
The district court stated that it relied upon a number of exhibits when it concluded that
Appellants' easement turned immediately south upon entering Parcel B, including Defendants'
Exhibits 42 and 44. However, these exhibits, which are aerial photographs of the relevant
property, indicate that the access road historically made a more gradual turn resembling a
shepherd's crook rather than a 90-degree turn. Defendant's Exhibit 41, an aerial pholograph
from 1978 also shows that the access road made a gradual turn through Parcel B before entering
Parcel A. Perhaps most telling is Plaintiffs Exhibit 253, which is a photograph of the shared
boundaly between Government Lot 2, Parcel B, and Parcel A, and the Quonset hut on Parcel A.
While the photograph was taken in 2003 (well after the prescriptive easement was established
prior to 1980), it is nonetheless informative. The photograph depicts a large hill to the south of
the access road, which the access road gradually curves around.

We recognize that the

uncontroverted evidence showed that the Akers permitted Peplinski to extend the access road
further to the west in Parcel B after the Akers purchased the property. I-Iowever, the photograp11
does not support a finding that the access road previously turned 90 degrees to the south
traveling straight up a steep hill in order to access Parcel A, as would be required if the access

road had immediately turned 90 degrees upon entering Parcel B. In light of this photographic
evidence, we conclude that there is not substantial evidence supporting the district court's
conclusion as to the location of Appellants' prescriptive easement on Parcel B. This issue must
he remanded to the disirici court for addiiionai fact finding coiisisieni with this opinion.
3. The' district court did not err when it found that the scope of Appellants'
prescriptive easement across the Akers' property was limited to a width of 12.2
feet.

Appellants argue that the scope of the prescriptive easement is at least 25 feet in width,
including ditches and shoulders. Appellants argue that their predecessors in interest originally
used the prescriptive easement for agricultural purposes and operated farming equipment in
excess of 20 feet in width on the access road. The district court concluded that the scope of
Appellants' prescriptive easement was 12.2 feet in width.
The district court examined a number of exhibits and personally viewed the property
during the trial before concluding that the scope of the prescriptive easement was limited to a
width of 12.2 feet. Thc district court based its finding of fact on Plaintiffs' exhibits 304 and 305.
These exhibits depict a portion of the access road without ditches or shoulders on either side.
The district court also considered the testimony of W.L. Millsap and Reynolds when it
considered the width of Appellants' prescriptive easement. The district court found, based on its
viewing of the property and the record, that the width of the traveled portion of the access road
was 12.2 feet. We conclude that the district court's finding is supported by substantial and
competent evidence and affirm the district court's decision.
D. The damages award and award of attorney fees and costs must be vacated.
As we held in Akers I, the question of whether and to what degree Appellants' conduct
constituted trespass on the Akers' property is intertwined with the question of the scope and
boundaries of Appellants' easement rights. Akers I, 142 Idaho at 304, 127 P.3d at 207. Because
the district court must determine the locatioll of Appellants' pvescriptive easement in Parcel B on
remand, we vacate the district court's award of damages below based upon trespass.
Similarly, we also vacate the district court's award of damages to Sherrie Akers for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court awarded Sherrie Akers $10,000 for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, for which Appellants are jointly and severally liable.
To support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a party must prove a breach of a
recognized leeal dutv. Nation v. State. Deut. ofCorr.. 144 Idaho 177. 191. 158 P.3d 953. 967

(2007). In the instant case, the district court predicated the award of damages for negligent
infliction of emotional distress on Appellants' malicious behavior while trespassing on the
Akers' property. As we indicated in A k e ~ I,
r the question of damages flowing from Appellants'
coilduct is inseparable fioiii considerakx of Appellants' easement rights. A!cc,-s I, 142 Ida!:o at
304, 127 P.3d at 207. Without a determination of Appellants' easement rights, it is impossible to
determine the scope of Appellants' trespass. Therefore, we vacate the district court's award of
damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress and remand the issue for further
determination after the district court determines Appellants' easement rights. For the same
reason, we vacate the district court's award of punitive damages in favor of the Akers.
For the same reasons that we vacate the district court's damage awards, we vacate the
district court's award of costs and attorney fees to the Akers.
E. Costs and Attorney Pees on Appeal
Both the Akers and Appellants request an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal. In
light of the mixed result in this case, we conclude that there is no prevailing party on appeal.
Therefore, we decline to award costs and attorney fees on appeal.

IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court's judgment that Appellants do not have an implied easement
by prior use and that Appellants' prescriptive easement is 12.2 feet in width. We vacate the
district court's judgment as to the location of the prescriptive easement in Parcel B, the award of
damages, and the award of attorney fees and costs. We remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not award attorney fees or costs on appeal.
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICIC, J. JONES and Justice Pro Tem TROUT
CONCUR.

